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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is a civil action for personal injury.

Jurisdiction of the court

appealed from is based on Utah Code Annotated Section 78-3-4(1) (1953 as
amended).
Jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court to hear this appeal is based on
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(j). This case has been poured-over to
the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
Judgment of the trial court was entered on March 21, 1990. A Rule 59
Motion for New Trial was served on March 21, 1990 which was denied by a
Memorandum Decision on May 10, 1990. Appellant's Notice of Appeal was
served and filed on May 23, 1990.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Three issues are raised by this appeal. First, whether the trial court
commits error by instructing the jury regarding tax consequences of a personal
injury judgment? Second, whether the trial court erred in precluding an expert
witness from giving an opinion on whether or not defendant was negligent?
Third, this appeal asks whether the district court erred in allowing into
evidence statements which were contained in a letter of settlement?

1

DETERMINATIVE RULES
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 408
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 704
(as set out verbatim in the addendum)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about May 28, 1986, the appellant, Grant Davidson, was injured
by a cow or steer that escaped from a wrecked truck driven by appellee, Erwin
M. Prince, while in the employment of appellee, Folkens Brothers Trucking.
(R. 1-2.) On November 17,1987, Davidson initiated suit in the Fourth Judicial
District Court of Utah County, State of Utah. Judgment was entered on
March 21, 1990, for Davidson and against the defendants in the sum of
$27,323.88, plus interest.
Davidson submits that three errors of law committed at the trial level
prejudiced his rights and denied him a fair resolution of the action. To correct
the three errors, on March 21, 1990, the appellant made a Motion for New
Trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion
was denied on May 10, 1990 in a Memorandum Decision setting out that if
indeed the three errors had occurred, they were harmless errors and did not
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warrant a new trial.

Appellant appeals this decision claiming the errors

committed at the trial court level were indeed harmful and prejudicial;
depriving the appellant a fair adjudication of the action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On or about May 28,1986, the defendant/appellee, Erwin M. Prince,
while acting in the course and scope of his employment for the appellee,
Folkens Brothers Trucking, did negligently operate his motor vehicle at the
location of approximately SR 15, in the curve from S.B. SF 15, so as to cause
vehicle to overturn. (R. 1-2.)
2. As a proximate result of appellee Erwin M. Prince's negligence,
various animals that were being shipped in his truck were released on the
highways and surrounding areas. (R. 2.)
3. Appellant was injured when an animal that had escaped from the
appellee's vehicle attacked and gored the appellant. (R. 2.)
4. The animal occupied the appellee's vehicle immediately prior to the
accident and the animal's escape was a proximate result of the appellee's
negligence in permitting his vehicle to overturn. (R. 2.)
5. Appellant retained counsel and filed suit against the appellees, Erwin
M. Prince and Folkens Brothers Trucking, for personal injury. (R. 1.)
6. During trial, expert opinion on the negligence of the defendants was
excluded on the grounds that the question was an ultimate issue to be decided
by the jury. (Partial Trial Transcript, Pages 22-23.)
3

7. Portions of a settlement negotiation letter were admitted as evidence
supporting the defense counsel's emphasis on the distance between the animal
and the appellant. (Partial Trial Transcript, Pages 47-48, 64-70, and 73-74.)
8. The jury instructions contained information on the tax consequences
of a personal injury judgment. (R. 225.)
9. The jury returned a verdict for the appellant. The jury found Grant
Davidson 40% negligent, Erwin Prince 60% negligent, and awarded Grant
Davidson $27,323.88 (60% of total award of $45,539.80), pre-judgment interest
on special damages of $2,980.38 and post-judgment interest of 12% per annum.
(R. 242-244.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GIVING THE JURY
INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF A
PERSONAL INJURY JUDGMENT.
The appellee requested and the court instructed the jury, over the
objection of appellant's counsel, on the tax consequences of a personal injury
judgment, (Partial Trial Transcript, Page 73.) There is apparently no Utah
decision which has addressed this issue. However, the vast majority of our
sister states have considered this issue and have ruled that such instructions
are improper and prejudicial.
This issue is addressed in 16 ALR 4th 589. A state by state review of the
decisions concerning this issue is set forth. It was indicated there that the
4

appellate courts of the following states have ruled that the instruction is
improper and prejudicial: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri (has cases going
both ways), Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
In contrast, the ALR article indicated that the only states that have
approved such an instruction as being proper are Delaware, Missouri (which
has cases going both ways), and New Jersey. The article lists two states,
Florida and Massachusetts, which have held that the instruction is
discretionary.
The reasoning of those courts which have found that it is improper to
instruct the jury on the tax consequences of personal injury judgments is
founded on firm logic and fundamental fairness. Juries are not instructed that
the amount awarded to an injured plaintiff will be reduced by the costs of
bringing his action to trial, or the attorney's fees required to obtain his day in
court. While the jury may certainly assume that such costs are inevitable, they
might mistakenly believe that the court will award these costs in addition to
compensation set by the jury. To instruct the jury, however, that there will be
no taxes on the amount that they award to an injured plaintiff suggests that
the plaintiff will be entitled to retain the whole of the amount awarded.
In the tort system of determining compensation the jury is asked to
arrive at an amount which will fully compensate the plaintiff. To instruct the
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jury that certain deductions will not be taken from the judgment, while failing
to instruct them on the deductions which will reduce the amount ultimately
received by the plaintiff is clearly prejudicial error.
Furthermore, the courts which have rejected such an instruction have
also pointed out one other obvious fact. The future tax liability of personal
injury judgments is a matter which is so speculative that the trial court may
not even be instructing on a correct premise of law.
A review of the decisions which have addressed this issue is illustrative:
The reason courts adopt the majority view of refusing to take
income tax consequences into consideration in awarding damages
for wrongful death is that the amount of a recipient's future
income tax liability is too conjectural or speculative a factor.
Scallon v. Hooper, 293 S.E.2d 843, 845 (N.CApp. 1982)
The court in Barnette v. Dovle, 622 P.2d 1349,1367 (Wyo. 1981), sets out that:
Similarly, whether the plaintiff has to pay a tax on the award is
a matter that concerns only the plaintiff and the government.
The tort-feasor has no interest in such question. And if the jury
were to mitigate the damages of the plaintiff by reason of the
income tax exemption accorded him, then the very Congressional
intent of the income tax law to give an injured party a tax benefit
would be nullified
Following the lead of the majority of state
courts that have decided the issue, we do not believe a trial judge
is required to instruct a jury that an award will not be subject to
federal income taxes. We so hold because we do not believe that
such an instruction is material to the proper determination of
damages; nor do we believe that a jury should be instructed on
federal taxes when it is not also instructed as to the effect of the
cost of attorneys fees, the costs incurred in preparing the case or
the various types of insurance that may be involved.
The court in Paducah Area Public Library v. Terry. 655 S.W.2d 19,25 (Ky.App.
1983) stated:
6

To inject the incidence of the ever changing tax scheme, federal
or state, into a jury damage trial would lead the jury into a
hopeless quagmire of confusion and conjecture. Since our test is
one's destroyed power to earn money, matters such as marital
status and personal consumption items such as debts, insurance
(savings), and general living expenses have been held irrelevant.
We think it logically follows that a tax debt to the government is
also irrelevant. We believe this rule is supported by sound
reasoning and ample authority. 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages S.88 and
Death S. 154 (1965). There appears to be no reason for abating
damages in favor of a wrongdoer by deducting tax payments solely
for his benefit
We hold that in personal injury actions such as
the case at hand the tax liability of claimant is not relevant to the
case. It can neither be inquired into on cross-examination or
submitted to the jury for consideration in making the award.
Similarly, the court in Dehn v. Proutv. 321 N.W.2d 534, 538-39 S.D. 1982)
quoting McWeenev v. New York. New Haven & Hartford R. R. Co.. 282 F.2d 34,
37-38 (2d Cir. 1960), states:
We know of no evidence in this case or empirical data
demonstrating that this jury or juries in general regularly increase
damage awards because of a mistaken belief that the state and
federal governments share in the award through income taxes.
Furthermore, if a cautionary instruction should be given the jury
to dissuade it from improperly increasing an award for income tax
purposes, then perhaps other cautionary instructions should also
be given on other collateral matters which conceivably affect the
amount of damages awarded by a jury. For example, a jury might
be instructed not to increase or decrease an award because one or
both of the parties must pay attorney's fees in the action.
It is respectfully submitted that an examination of the cases cited shows
that the better rule is the majority rule. 'The majority view in this nation, by
nearly a five-to-one ratio, is that income tax considerations should not be
impressed upon a jury." Dehn v. Proutv, 321 N.W.2d 534 (S.D. 1982). See
also, Hansen v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.. 734 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1984);
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Kirk v. Ford Motor Company. 383 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. App. 1985); Rivera v.
Philadelphia Theological Seminary. 474 A2d 605 (Pa.Super. 1984); Anderson
v. Teamsters Local 116 BLDG. Club. 347 N.W.2d 309 (N.D. 1984); Maricle v.
Spiegel. 329 N.W.2d 80 (Neb. 1983); Hall v. County of New Madrid. 645 S.W.2d
149 (Mo.App. 1982); Young v. Environmental Air Products. Inc.. 665 P.2d 88
(ArizApp. 1982); Terveer v. Baschnagel. 445 N.E.2d 264 (Ohio App. 1982); W.M.
Bashlin Co. v. Smith. 643 S.W.2d 526 (Ark. 1982).
The fact that personal injury awards may not be taxable, while true, is
irrelevant to the jury's determination. As appellant's counsel indicated in his
objection to this instruction, the court will not instruct on other facts involving
the damage award, despite the fact that they are also true, because they
prejudice the jury's decision. For example, the jury is not instructed that onethird of the eventual award, minus costs, will go as attorney's fees. The jury
is also not instructed that liability insurance is available to satisfy the
judgment. While all of these factors are true, they are irrelevant to the jury's
decision and serve to unduly prejudice the jury in making its determination.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT EXCLUDED THE
TESTIMONY OF APPELLANT'S EXPERT CONCERNING THE
APPELLEE'S NEGLIGENCE.
During the presentation of appellant's case in chief, Mr. Newell Knight,
an accident reconstruction expert, was called to testify to appellee's negligence.
Counsel for appellant asked Mr. Knight if he had an opinion, in light of his
8

training, skill, and experience, as well as his investigation into the accident, on
whether or not the defendant was negligent. Mr. Knight stated that he had an
opinion. When asked to express that opinion, counsel for the appellee objected
on the grounds that the question embraced the ultimate issue to be decided by
the jury. The court sustained the objection over the exception of appellant's
counsel.
For many years an expert was not allowed to offer an opinion on the
ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. However, that rule has long since
fallen by the way side, first through appellate decisions and then through the
Utah Rules of Evidence.
Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact,
See ShurtlefP v. Jav Tuft & Co.. 622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980).
Appellant maintains that the improper exclusion of this testimony was
indeed prejudicial. The testimony of Mr. Knight involved elements of physics
and other sciences which can be extremely difficult for a lay person to grasp.
While it is certainly possible that some jurors possess sufficient education and
understanding to comprehend the expert's testimony in this regard, other
jurors may have more difficulty in understanding the substance of the
testimony. It is therefore necessary in order to present a proper case to all
jurors that expert testimony provide not only its scientific basis, but its
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fundamental conclusion.

It is to be noted in this case the jury wiw not

unanimous on the issue of liability, and it is very probable that the restrictions
placed upon appellant's counsel in presenting IILH case uii till levels tinned
appellant the right to a fair trial on this issue. Appellant would therefore
contend that this error in hw should be corrected by the granting of a new
trial.
POINT 111
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE
OF STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS.
In addition to appellant's claim of error concerning evidence which w < -ut
to the question of appellee's negligence, appellant also believes that error
occurred in relation to evidence «• lu< h addi essed appellee's claim of appellant's
contributory negligence. Appellee's theory at trial was that the appellant was
negligent in cornering the animal which had escaped from the appellee's truck
and eventually caused the injury in question.
In presenting his case, appellee's counsel placed great emphasis on the
distance between appellant and the animal at, I he lime tlu animal chained
Evidence was presented from the appellant's deposition that he estimated the
distance to be approximately 4(1 leel h ur 1 her evidence was ehcited at trial that
the distance may have been approximately 22 feet.
However, al trial the appellee's counsel attempted and succeeded in
introducing a statement from a letter of compromise written (u (lit1 appellee
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wherein the distance was estimated at 10 feet.

This testimony obviously

provided far greater support to appellee's theory that appellant had "cornered"
the animal.
Appellant's counsel objected to this testimony on the grounds that it was
contained in a letter of settlement negotiation. The court overruled appellant's
objection and allowed the statement to come in, and then went further to
prohibit the remainder of the letter to be presented to the jury so that the
context of the communication could be adequately understood.
Appellant respectfully submits that this ruling was in error in light of
Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. That Rule provides:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or
(2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable
consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a
claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require
the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely
because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations.
This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is
offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of
a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution,
(emphasis added)
An examination of the letter in question (addendum) shows that it is
very clearly a conmnmication involving an offer or willingness to settle
plaintiffs claim. The statement which was admitted was made in the letter of
negotiation and according to the Rule is likewise not admissible.
11

The prejudicial effect of this testimony is obviously great in Hit pn M ttt
case. A person's conduct when confronted by a potentially dangerous animal
at a distance of 40 feet would be different from the leasouabk person b conduct
at a distance of 10 feet. Because appellee's counsel placed this question in the
context oi whether tin aiimi tl u t

not m i n i

the distance is extremely

important.
It 1% ot course, to be noted that this error was once again pointed out to
the court immediately preceding closing arguments. The court \u\\ ingnwiowod
the Rules of Evidence instructed the appellee's counsel to make no reference
to this testimony in his closing argument
Nevertheless, appellant contends that this action did not cure the error,
and directly resulted in the hi^ti percentage of negligence placed upon the
appellant by the jury as well as the low damages which were awarded.
Initially, appellant would contend that the evidence was already presented to
the jury, and that its impact was significant because it, was allowed in met i IK
objection of counsel in the presence of the jury.

Furthermore, appellee's

counsel, while not directly alluding to the id tool disunite referred to in that
letter, nevertheless made several references in closing statement which would
iLiniiid tin (in \ of tin

damaging testimony.

Counsel once referred to a

"letter". When making his argument that the appellant had "cornered" the
animal, he indicated that appellant had estimated other distances during the
course of the proceedings. Of course, the only n idem e a.s In nlhei distances
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in this case was the 10-foot estimation which the court had instructed counsel
to refrain from addressing.

(Supplemental Partial Trial Transcript, page

number pending receipt of transcript.)
Therefore, appellee counsel's masterful use of innuendo obviously served
to undermine any curative effect which the court's restrictions on closing
argument may have had, and very clearly resulted in prejudice to the appellant
in the ultimate decision of the jury.
The public policy supporting the exclusion of evidence contained in
settlement negotiations is a strong one. The courts are provided to resolve
disputes which cannot be otherwise resolved.

However, the law should

encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes without resort to the courts.
Indeed, the courts would be crippled if the number of disputes currently
resolved without trial were to drastically increase.
Undoubtedly, resolution of disputes without judicial process would
become far more limited if statements made in settlement negotiations were
to be admitted in the trial of those matters which are not resolved. While the
critical admission in the present case went only to an opinion of facts in a letter
which plaintiff wrote without careful reflection and before he had consulted
with counsel, other settlement negotiations require for success candor in
assessing one's potential liabilities. The necessary dialogue concerning the
strengths and weaknesses of one's legal claims would surely be frustrated if any
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inroads are IHTIIUI te<f on the longstanding rule prohibiting the admission of
evidence from settlement negotiations at trial.
POINT IV
THE ERRORS WHICH OCCURRED IN THE TRIAL COURT ARE
PREJUDICIAL AND SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTED THE
OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL.
Appellant maintains that if the foregoing had not occurred, th» ISSIH^ of
negligence and damages would have been ruled on differently. Utah case law
establishes that in cases where errors occur and most, likely a different result
or ruling would have been obtained if the errors had not occurred; those errors
are prejudicial,, and a new trial is in order.

However, the errors must be

substantial and go to the heart of litigant's rights and the fair adjudication of
the actioi,I Pearce v. Wistisen. 701 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah 1989) states;
Nor is the fact alone that evidence was erroneously admitted
sufficient to set aside a verdict unless it has "had a substantial
influence in bringing about the verdict." Conversely, where
evidence was shown to have supported only conjectural inferences
which had little probative value, or where no evidence was
adduced that showed that a fact had any causal connection with
the plaintiffs injury, reviewing courts have reversed cases on
grounds that the improperly admitted evidence could only have
served to confuse and mislead the jury or to prejudice the
outcome of the case, [citations omitted]
Conversely, Egbert & Javnes v. R.C. Tolman Const.. 680 P.2d 746, 747 Utah
1984) states !ha! :« ruling of a trial court will not be reversed if substantial
evidence supports the ruling.
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State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989), defines the two types of errors
that result in reversal. The first type is where the right for review is preserved
in the trial court by making timely objections and motions raising the issues
for review. The second type is where the issues have not been preserved in the
court below, however, their "manifest injustice" requires their review.
In the present situation the issues were preserved below and therefore
are analyzed accordingly. The standard as set out in Verde establishes that for
review,"... there is a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome
in the trial court." Id. at 121, 770 P.2d 116. Redev. Agcv. of Salt Lake Citv v.
Tanner. 740 P.2d 1296, 1303-04 (Utah 1987) also states, "the exclusion of
evidence is harmless unless the excluded evidence would probably have had a
substantial influence in bringing about a different finding."
In Ashton v. Ashton. 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987) the court required
that the error be "substantial and prejudicial in that the appellant was deprived
in some manner of a full and fair consideration of the disputed issues by the
jury." Ashton also quotes Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as
stating:
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and
no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or
omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for
granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order,
unless refusal to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of
the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the
parties.

15

The three errors complained of in the present case went to the heart of
the jury's determination.

Davidson bruits flit1 present appeal because he

complains both that the amount of the damages awarded were too low, and the
percentage of negligence assigned to him was too high. The court's instruction
on the tax consequences of a personal injury judgment clearly inviten tin* jury
lot educe their award, just as they would be inclined to increase their award
if they were instructed that the amount given will IK* reduced by a one-third
contingent fee to the plaintiff's attorney and any costs incurred in pursuing the
action.

Likewise, 40% contributtuy negligence assigned to plaintiff was

obviously based on defendant's argument that Davidson had cornered the
animal which hml escaped fmm defendant's truck. This argument found its
greatest support through a statement contained m a lettei of settlement
negotiation which was improperly admitted. Finally, appellant maintains that
a greater amount of negligence would have been assigned In the defendant (and
hence a lesser amount of negligence assigned to plaintiff) had plaintiff's expert
not been restricted from providing the jurv with his conclusions from his
scientific investigation of the accident.
Appellant respeetfully submits that the errors, defects, or omissions of
the trial court substantially affected his rights and hindered a fair adjudication
of his action and therefore, is inconsistent with substantial justice. Appellant
also respectfully submits thai had these-1 <»irors defects, and omissions not
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occurred, the confusion regarding negligence and damages would not have
occurred, and the verdict would reflect an accurate and judicially fair result.
CONCLUSION
The instruction concerning tax aspects of damage awards ran contrary
to the general weight of authority in our sister states, and served to imduly
prejudice the jury's determination on damages. The two errors concerning
admission of evidence going to the issue of each party's negligence appear to
have a direct impact on the fact finder's determination that the negUgence
should be split 60-40. In addition, when examining the amount of stipulated
special damages, in light of the 60-40 split of negligence, it is clear that the
jury's findings as to damages were directly tied to their findings of negligence.
Accordingly, appellant would respectfully request the court to cure these
errors by remanding for a new trial on all issues where proper evidence as to
appellee's negUgence may be admitted and where improper evidence concerning
appellee's allegations of appeUant's contributory negligence will be excluded.
DATED AND SIGNED this

\fytos

of November, 1990.

IVIEtfYOUNG
Attorneys for AppeUant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, R. Phil Ivie, hereby certify that on the

\^y

r^.day of November,

1990,1 servei I four 141 copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant, upon H. James
Clegg, counsel for the appellees in this matter, by mailing to hmi by first i hss
mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address:
H. JAMES CLEGG, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 8414f>
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ADDENDUM

I. DETERMINATIVE RULES
A. 11 (ah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59
14. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule HI
C Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 408
D. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 704

11 LETTER OF SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATION

19

Rule 59

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion tor a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Juror's competency as witness as to validity
Rule 59. F.A. IP.
of verdict or indictment, Rules of E if ence,
Cross-Refe ences. — Fee for filing motion Rule 606.
un - w ' lai, * 21-2-2.
HanHe** ,i*t>r not ground foi new trialf
R>le 6

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Cited in Goddard v. Bundy, 121 Utah 299,
241 P.2d 462 (1952); Board of Educ. v. Cox, 16
Utah 2d 20, 395 P.2d 55 (1964); Parker v.
Rolfson, 525 P.2d 612 (Utah 1974); Dynapac,
Inc. v. Innovations, Inc., 550 P.2d 191 (Utah
1976), Olsen v. Cummings, 565 P.2d 1123
(Utah 1977); Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc.,
589 P.2d 767 (Utah 1978); Peay v. Peay, 607
P.2d 841 (Utah 1980); Miller Pontiac, Inc. v.
Osborne, 622 P.2d 800 (Utah 1981); Kohler v.
Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 1981); St.
Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982);
Kanzee v. Kanzee, 668 P.2d 495 (Utah 1983);

Rule 61

Pease v. Industrial Comm'n, 694 P.2d 613
(Utah 1984); Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700
(Utah 1985); In re Estate of Chasel, 725 P.2d
1345 (Utah 1986); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92
(Utah 1986); Myers v. Garff, 655 F. Supp. 1021
(D. Utah 1987); Wood v. Weenig, 736 P.2d 1053
(Utah 1987); Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d
1318 (Utah 1987); Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 P.2d
1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Blodgett v. Zions
First Natl Bank, 752 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App.
1988); Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d
131 (Utah 1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§§ 200, 671 et seq.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 228 et seq.,
237.
A.L.R. — Incompetence of counsel as ground
for relief from state court civil judgment, 64
A.L.R.4th 323.
Relief from judicial error by motion under
F.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(1), 1 A.L.R. Fed. 771.
Propriety of conditions imposed in granting
relief from judgment under Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), 3 A.L.R. Fed. 956.
Construction of Rule 60(a) of Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure authorizing correction of
clerical mistakes and judgments, orders or
other parts of the records and errors therein
arising from oversight or omission, 13 A.L.R.
Fed. 794.
Construction and application of Rule 60(b)(5)

of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizing
relief from final judgment where its prospective application is inequitable, 14 A.L.R. Fed.
309.
Independent actions to obtain relief from
judgment, order, or proceeding under Rule
60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
53 A.L.R. Fed. 558.
Lack of jurisdiction, or jurisdictional error,
as rendering federal district court judgment
"void" for purposes of relief under Rule 60(b)(4)
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 59 A.L.R.
Fed. 831.
Effect of filing of notice of appeal on motion
to vacatejudgment under Rule 60(b) of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 A.L.R. Fed. 148.
Key Numbers. — Judgment *» 294 et seq.,
306, 307.

Rule 61. Harmless error.
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error
or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 61, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Admission of evidence.
Amendment of pleadings.
Burden of showing error.
Exclusion of evidence.
Instructions.
Judgment presumed valid.

Judicial nooice.
Liability for costs.
Notice of appeal.
Party creating or appro ing error.
Refusal to « ^»ct vf***di^.
Refusal to grant mistri*\
Servic of s. . mu <*s.
Substantial! * nf t rr*r.
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Rule 408. Compromise and offers to compromise.
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either
validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the
claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in
the course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or
prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable
to Rules 52 and 53, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971) but is broader to the extent that it excludes statements made in the course of negotiations.

Cross-References. — Offer of judgment,
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 68.
Release or settlement of personal injury
claim, rescission or disavowal of, § 78-27-32.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Settlement agreement.
Cited.
Settlement agreement.
e,
When an injured plaintiff and one or more,
but not all, defendant tortfeasors enter into a
st
settlement agreement, the parties must
rpromptly inform the court and the other pareties to the action of the existence of the agreement and of its terms. If the action is tried by a

jury, the court shall, upon motion ot a party,
disclose the existence and basic content of the
agreement to the jury unless the court finds
that, on facts particular to the case, such disclosure will create substantial danger of undue
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. Slusher v. Ospital, 111 Utah
Adv. Rep. 18 (1989).
Cited in Hector, Inc. v. United Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 741 P.2d 542 (Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence
§ 629 et seq.
C.J.S. — 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 285.
A.L.R. — Admissibility of admissions made
in connection with offers or discussions of compromise, 15 A.L.R.3d 13.

Admissibility of evidence showing payment,
or offer or promise of payment, of medical, hospital, and similar expenses of injured party by
opposing party, 65 A.L.R.3d 932.
Key Numbers. — Evidence «» 213.

Rule 704. Opinion on ultimate issue.
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
of fact.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and comports with
Rule 56(4), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). See

Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah
1979).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general.
Cited.
In general.
The expertise of the witness, his degree of
familiarity with the necessary facts, and the
logical nexus between his opinion and the facts
adduced must be established before an expert's

opinion is admissible as to an ultimate issue.
Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah
1979) (referred to in Advisory Committee
Note).
Opinion testimony of expert witness was not
rendered inadmissible by fact that it may have
embraced the ultimate factual issue to be decided by the jury. Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft & Co.,
622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980).
Cited in Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft & Co., 622

P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980); American Concept Ins.
Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P.2d 271 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Comment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the
Courtroom: New Utah Rules and Their Consti-

tutional Implications, 15 J. Contemp. L. 81
(1989).

October 1, 1987

To whom it may concern
Re; injury claim
Gentlemen:
It appears you have been poorly informed as to Mr. Grant
Davidson's injury claim.
Please allow us to clairify: ^r. Davidson while performing
his job for the D & RGW Railroad, saw the injured cow sitting on
the railroad. He stopped and got: out some 10 feet from the
animal. He made no move towards the injured cow but while
standing still was charged. He fled the cow, but it caught him,
goreing him in the back rind sending him air born for
approximately 2 0 feet whtre he landed on the rail en his knee.
The attack continued with the cow attempting to trample
Mr. Davidson to death, as he lay stunned with a concussion on the
ground he pushed the animal off and escaped to the safety of a
rail car.
The cow continued to charge repeatedly and finally moved
off. It then charged nany others before it was kiPed.
Mr. Davidson did not persue, chase or attempt to move the
cow. As it (the cow) was injured in the accident, it became
abnormally dangerous.
We have been advised by legal counsel that the contents of a
truck, when they spill and are dangerous (as this case). Are the
responsibility of the insurer when those dangerous contents
injure innocent people.
Mr. Davidson has a permenate knee problem, and
brace while doing any work. He's had 16 years with
which is now jepordized by this injury. He has lost
great suffering and now is going to be disabled the
life.

must wear a
this job,
wages, has
rest of his

We don't intend to ±et you or that trucking company off, with a
letter telling us that your not responsible.

P<~ge Two
September 29, 1987
You may speak with us d i r e c t l y c r we can send i t t o
and t o c o u r t , you d e c i d e .
Very sincerely,

Grant S. Davidson

Sandy J. Davidson

lawyers

